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Abstract: Nowadays, there is an increasing number of cameras placed on mobile devices connected
to the Internet. Since these cameras acquire and process sensitive and vulnerable data in applications
such as surveillance or monitoring, security is essential to avoid cyberattacks. However, cameras on
mobile devices have constraints in size, computation and power consumption, so that lightweight
security techniques should be considered. Camera identification techniques guarantee the origin
of the data. Among the camera identification techniques, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
allow generating unique, distinctive and unpredictable identifiers from the hardware of a device.
PUFs are also very suitable to obfuscate secret keys (by binding them to the hardware of the device)
and generate random sequences (employed as nonces). In this work, we propose a trusted camera
based on PUFs and standard cryptographic algorithms. In addition, a protocol is proposed to protect
the communication with the trusted camera, which satisfies authentication, confidentiality, integrity
and freshness in the data communication. This is particularly interesting to carry out camera control
actions and firmware updates. PUFs from Static Random Access Memories (SRAMs) are selected
because cameras typically include SRAMs in its hardware. Therefore, additional hardware is not
required and security techniques can be implemented at low cost. Experimental results are shown to
prove how the proposed solution can be implemented with the SRAM of commercial Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) chips included in the communication module of the camera. A proof of concept shows
that the proposed solution can be implemented in low-cost cameras.
Keywords: cameras on mobile devices; camera security; camera identification; trusted cameras;
physically unclonable functions (PUFs); SRAM PUFs
1. Introduction
Cameras are employed in many applications that require high security, like the widely used
surveillance systems. Nowadays, many networked cameras are not part of closed circuit television
(CCTV) systems or closed image sensor networks. Instead, they are connected to larger and public
networks such as the Internet. This implies an increase of the security risks because cameras are
attractive targets for cyberattacks [1]. In addition, many cameras are not static, but they are placed on
mobile devices since current daily life is featured by mobility. The problem is that cameras on mobile
devices have constraints in size, computational capabilities, and power consumption, so that their
security has to be achieved at low cost [2].
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Inclusion of cameras in mobile devices has spread their application domains. In military applications,
for example, tiny cameras are included on the helmets of troops to help soldiers in the battlefield.
Cameras can identify the objects in front of the soldiers to detect threats and to share information among
them and the officers in charge of the mission. In novel surveillance applications, spy drones with
cameras are being increasingly used by police units, government sectors or officials and military forces.
Cameras in civil action applications related to sports such as cycling, surfing, running, etc., are highly
demanded. The Internet of Things cameras, such as baby monitors or telecare cameras, and the
cameras used in medical devices, such as endoscope cameras, are also being increasingly used [3,4].
Since in most of the above-mentioned applications the receivers do not see the scenes that the
camera is capturing, they have to trust in the camera. A requirement of any trusted communication is
the authentication of the sending point, that is, the receiver should be able to verify that the received
images have been captured by a previously identified camera. This is the first link of a digital chain of
custody. Camera identification is an important branch of multimedia forensics that aims to associate
specific captures to the source camera from which they were taken. As a matter of fact, digital
content can be used as evidence in judicial proceedings provided that the camera is proven to have
been capturing the criminal activity. Camera identification is also interesting to avoid counterfeiting
cameras. Counterfeiting is a big problem, not only for original camera manufacturers, who can lose lot
of money, but also for consumers, because the lower quality of fake cameras increases the probability
of application failures.
In many cases, the information acquired by the camera is sensitive. This happens if they are used
by police or military forces, or if they can threat personal privacy and anonymity (since it is possible,
for example, to track and identify people with digital cameras). Attackers may want to intercept the
information transmitted by the camera in order to gain information. In these cases, not only camera
identification is required for trusted communication but also information encryption is required to
avoid sniffing attacks. Confidentiality of the images is also imposed by legal regulations in order to
preserve sensitive personal data [1].
In addition, if information sent by a camera is not authenticated, man-in-the-middle attacks can
be carried out. The images can be altered and false images can be injected to show a situation that
replaces the real scene. An example of man-in-the-middle attack is the facial reenactment described
in [5], where the content of the video captured by a camera is modified in real time before being
received (the facial expressions of a target actor are changed by the expressions of a source actor).
There are also popular software tools, like Virtual Webcam, ManyCam or Magic Camera, which are
able to modify the images captured and to simulate real-time captures. To avoid man-in-the-middle
attacks, information integrity is required.
Another well-known cyberattack is to take the remote control of the camera and to record data
without the knowledge and permission of the camera’s owners. For example, the control of a camera
connected to the Internet is usually taken by obtaining the password employed for the WiFi connection.
These attacks are produced even if the cameras are in the stand-by (or energy-saving) mode because
they are designed to maintain a wireless connection in any circumstance, for example by using the
Bluetooth communication module. A well-known Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack was
performed in October 2016 by means of installing the Mirai malware on a large number of devices [6].
In this case, remotely controlled bots, mostly Internet-connected cameras, were employed to spread
the malware. In order to avoid this, the firmware (the code) to be executed by the camera should be
proven to be authentic [7–9].
Many techniques have been proposed for camera identification in the last two decades [10–27].
An identifier is extracted and associated with a camera as a fingerprint that makes it distinguishable
from another one (of the same brand or even of the same model). Camera identifiers are features that
can be extracted from three types of sources: (1) metadata assigned to the camera; (2) captures from
which to obtain characteristics defined by the electronics components and processing algorithms of the
camera; and (3) electronic components from which to extract intrinsic characteristics of the camera
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hardware. In the latter case, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been reported to generate
unique, distinctive and unpredictable identifiers produced by the manufacturing process variability of
the hardware [28]. In contrast to metadata (which are externally assigned to the camera), or identifiers
extracted from the captures (which depend on the type of external scenes), hardware-based PUFs are
intrinsic to the camera and are directly extracted from the camera hardware [23–27]. These PUFs allow
adding security functionalities at a low cost, without burdening the processing unit of the camera.
This is why this paper presents a camera identification technique using hardware-based PUFs.
Encryption algorithms should be selected carefully to provide real-time performance with low-cost
cameras on mobile devices, which have constrained computing and memory resources. Digital Rights
Management (DRM) schemes are widely used to protect video streams on the Internet, but they employ
cryptographic techniques that are computationally intensive for low-cost cameras. Cryptographic
techniques (symmetric and asymmetric) are the standard techniques to provide security. The symmetric
cryptography techniques, which employ the same key to cipher and decipher, have the problem
of secret key communication through non-secure channels, and the vulnerability to repudiation
attacks, because they do not use digital signatures. On the other side, the asymmetric techniques,
which employ a pair of public–private keys for each communication extreme, are computationally
more complex than symmetric techniques, particularly for multimedia data, and require larger key
sizes (generally, the double). Hence, asymmetric techniques are usually employed to interchange
keys through non-secure communication channels and to create digital signatures (which provide
non-repudiation), and symmetric techniques are used to cipher and decipher the data [1,29,30]. Several
solutions based on chaos theory, cellular automata and DNA computing have been reported to
authenticate encrypted images [31]. However, since they do not follow cryptographic standards,
their security can be compromised [32]. This is why this paper focuses on standard and symmetric
cryptographic techniques.
The contribution of this work is the proposal of a lightweight solution for trusted cameras based
on binding the software executed in the camera to the hardware of the same camera (without inclusion
of additional hardware). The solution is designed as a complete cryptographic solution that provides
camera identification, information confidentiality and integrity, as well as a protocol that protects the
communication with the camera, which is particularly interesting to carry out trustworthy camera
control actions and firmware updates. PUFs are extracted from the Static Random Access Memories
(SRAMs) included in the camera hardware to generate the physical identity of the camera, to obfuscate
cryptographic keys, and to obtain nonces (numbers used only once). In summary, the proposed solution
provides: (a) authentication by guaranteeing the origin of the data through the camera identifiers
extracted from PUFs; (b) information confidentiality by ciphering the messages with secret keys that
are not stored in the camera but reconstructed whenever needed with the identifiers extracted from
PUFs; (c) information integrity by means of Message Authentication Codes (MACs); and (d) freshness
in the communication through the nonces extracted from PUFs. Experimental results obtained from
the SRAM-based PUFs found in the low-cost cameras validate the proposal. A proof of concept shows
that the proposed solution can be implemented in low-cost cameras.
A preliminary version of this work appears in [27]. This work does not provide details of the
operation modes of the camera and does not describe any communication protocol with the camera.
A standard off-the-shelf SRAM is used as PUF, which is not included in any unit of the camera,
and experimental results are provided for the PUF working at nominal operation conditions.
The new contributions of this paper are the following. It summarizes the camera identification
techniques proposed in the literature and mentions the motivations to select SRAM PUFs as camera
identifiers. This is the focus of Section 2. Section 3 details the algorithms executed in enrollment
and normal operation phases to generate camera identifiers, nonces and secret keys which are
employed in standard cryptographic algorithms. A trustworthy communication protocol is proposed
in Section 4 which satisfies authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and freshness by means of
authenticated encryption and key derivation techniques based on the trusted cameras previously
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described. This paper employs as PUF the SRAM included in the communication unit of the camera and
more exhaustive experimental results are included, particularly with the PUF working at non-nominal
operation conditions. These experimental results concerning reliability, uniqueness, unpredictability
and randomness of the identifiers and nonces extracted from the SRAM PUF are shown and discussed
in Section 5. A prototype of a low-cost trusted camera is presented also in Section 5 as a proof of
concept. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Summary of Camera Identification Techniques
Several camera identification techniques have been reported in the literature. The simplest ones
employ metadata, related to information stored in the camera about the conditions of the image
acquisition. The most common metadata are Exif (Exchangeable images file format), which usually
include the version of the camera software, the image resolution, date and time and, in some cases,
the GPS coordinates of the image acquisition. A main drawback of these techniques is to be very
vulnerable to malicious attacks. The metadata file can be modified easily, for example by using
multimedia processing tools. A similar approach is to assign a specific number to each camera,
for example, identifying a camera by its MAC (Media Access Control) address. However, a MAC
address can also be faked easily.
Other techniques extract identification features from the camera captures, taking advantage that
the software and hardware components of the camera leave traces in the content of the images [10].
Identification features can be extracted from statistical information, color components, image quality
metrics, and frequency domain of the images. Generally, several features are combined to obtain more
accuracy in identification. A feature selection algorithm is usually employed to consider the most
representative features, and a complex classification process, generally based on a Support Vector
Machine (SVM), is applied. In [10], 16 statistical, 12 color, 40 quality, and 81 wavelet features are
considered. The 16 statistical values (mean, median, maximum, minimum, variance, kurtosis and
skewness) are computed for rows and columns, as well as their ratio (between rows and columns).
The 12 color features are extracted from the pixels’ average values for each RGB channel, correlation
pairs between RGB bands, neighbor distribution center of mass for each color band, and energy ratios
between RGB pairs. In order to detect the 40 quality differences in brightness, sharpness and color
quality, measures based on the pixels differences, correlation and spectral distance are taken. Prior to
the computation of the image quality metrics, a filtering should be applied to reduce the noise of the
original image (for example, a Gaussian filter to perform image smoothing). The 81 wavelet features
are obtained from the pattern noise image (from 3 color channels × 3 wavelet components × 9 central
components). Therefore, this approach requires high computing resources.
Deep learning is also applied to camera identification, specifically for identification of the
manufacturer and the model of the camera. In [11], a fixed high-pass filter suppresses image content
(such as interferences caused by image edges and textures) and extracts low-level features. The filter is
applied to each color channel separately. Then, a wavelet-based denoising filter is applied and the
resulting image is fed to a Convolutional Neural Network. In [12], the fixed high-pass linear filter
is replaced by a nonlinear filter. The feature maps produced by a set of constrained convolutional
filters concatenated with the nonlinear feature residuals are then passed to a regular convolutional
layer. The approaches based on deep learning require not only higher computing resources than the
previously commented approach but also big databases for training.
The lens system of a camera has been also employed to generate identifiers since they can
introduce distinctive aberrations, such as astigmatism, spherical, coma, radial distortion, field
curvature, chromatic aberrations, or dust particles. The drawback of these aberrations is that their
permanence in time is reduced, which limits its use as camera fingerprints [13].
Other authors consider the interpolation algorithms used to obtain the Color Filter Array (CFA).
The configuration of the CFA filters, the demosaicing algorithm, and the color processing techniques
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introduce significant differences between cameras of different manufacturers. However, this approach
is not efficient at differentiating between different models from the same manufacturer [13].
Regarding identification techniques based on the image sensor, the most extended ones employ the
Sensor Pattern Noise (SPN). It is the spatial pattern formed by the minor changes in the intensity of the
pixels caused by the imperfections of the sensor manufacturing process, including the inhomogeneity
of silicon wafers. In [14], the dark current noise component (also called Fixed Pattern Noise, FPN) is
employed. The dark current noise is a signal collected from the sensor when it is not exposed to light
and, thus, dark current can only be extracted from dark frames. This limits the method because camera
identification is not possible from regular (non-dark) frames. In addition, some consumer cameras
suppress this noise automatically by subtracting a dark frame from every image they take. The most
used noise component is named Photo Response Non Uniformity (PRNU) [15], which is determined by
the different sensitivity of the pixels to light. Not every pixel of the sensor is identical and will therefore
respond differently to the same amount of light. The amount of photons converted in electrons by
the pixels is associated with the photosensitive area and the presence of imperfections in the sensor
chip. Thus, the PRNU is a multiplicative factor of the photoelectron number. In order to determine
the PRNU of a camera, the first step is the application of an averaging operation to several images.
In a second step, the noise is extracted from the averaged frame by applying a filtering operation.
The performance of the PRNU extractor depends on the choice of that filtering. Wavelet transform,
sparse 3D transform-domain collaborative filtering or context-adaptive interpolation algorithms
are considered in the literature. Then, the noise pattern is obtained by subtracting the averaged
frame without the noise from the averaged frame with the noise. In addition, spectrum equalization
algorithms are considered to detect and suppress the peaks created by other artifacts (such as CFA
patterns), which are similar in cameras of the same model or brand and thus survive the averaging
operation. Once the approximated PRNU noise is obtained, the presence of the reference pattern in the
image is evaluated by using correlation.
PRNU is effective when the images have good quality and are acquired under specific conditions.
Since the noise contains not only the PRNU information but also traces of scene details, flat-field
images (e.g., blue sky) are preferred. However, flat-field images are not always available and images
with varying scene details have to be considered. In this case, the impact of scene details should
be suppressed by averaging a higher number of images [16]. In addition, the use of PRNU is not
very efficient in low-quality cameras because they can introduce noise components that affect the
PRNU estimation [17].
From a computational point of view, the dimensionality of PRNUs is as large as the original
image. Thus, the storage space, the time to access the memory, and the matching complexity are
considerable. In order to reduce PRNU dimensionality, decision trees [18], binarization [19], PCA
(Principal Component Analysis) and LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis) techniques [20], and random
projections [16,21] have been applied. In the case of decision trees, the number of matchings is
reduced but matching errors tend to increase when a large number of PRNUs are stored. Binarization
reduces the storage in memory, but it degrades the matching accuracy due to information loss. PCA
and LDA are applied to extract more compact PRNU representations. The disadvantage of this
proposal is that the system needs to be re-trained if PRNUs from new cameras have to be included.
Dimensionality is also reduced by means of random projections, which are not based on learning and
do not require training. However, since the subspace is randomly selected, the representation is not
optimal and the matching accuracy is compromised. Despite the complexity of the PRNU extraction
process, the separation between intra-class (measurements from the genuine camera) and inter-class
distributions (measurements from impostor cameras) is not complete [20].
The use of high frequency components of the PRNU pattern estimated from raw photos acquired
in controlled conditions is proposed in [22] as a weak PUF. In the enrollment phase, PRNU information
compressed with adaptive random projections is used to obfuscate a random binary sequence encoded
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with polar codes and to generate a secure sketch. In the authentication phase, only the genuine camera
is able to recover the original binary sequence from the secure sketch.
Recent works propose the use of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to extract bit strings
from the response of specific hardware components included in the camera. These bit strings can be
employed as camera identifiers because PUFs allow generating unique, distinctive and unpredictable
identifiers produced by the manufacturing process variability of the hardware [28].
In [23], the response of the pixels in a charge-coupled device (CCD) to a defined incident light is
used as PUF. The light source is conceived to be integrated into the camera circuit in combination with
a movable opaque cover to prevent undesirable incident light on the CCD. The analog electrical signals
emitted by the pixels are converted into digital signals which are employed as camera identifiers.
The disadvantage of this proposal is that extra hardware modules should be included in the camera.
In [24], PUFs are extracted from Dark Signal Non-Uniformity (DSNU) in CMOS image sensors.
The PUF response is a binary string extracted from the pixel array. Each response bit is obtained
by comparing the reset voltages of two pixels. The output bit is ‘0’ or ‘1’ depending on which reset
voltage is larger. The selection of the pixel pairs is determined by a digital input challenge and a seed
that initializes a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). The input challenge selects the first pixel and
the second pixel is selected by encrypting (XOR-ing) the input challenge with an LFSR-based stream
cipher. The pixel pair is selected for the PUF response if their reset voltage difference is greater than a
predefined threshold Pth, so as to ensure that the output bit is stable. Given an input challenge and a
seed, the Hamming Distance between the PUF response obtained and the PUF response stored in a
server is calculated. If the distance is sufficiently small, the camera is correctly identified. This approach
requires additional hardware because a switch transistor should be included in each pixel of the image
sensor (the measurements cannot be obtained directly from commercial CMOS image sensors). Another
disadvantage is that the proposal for authentication is based on extracting the seed of the LFSR from
features of captured images that are sent to the central monitor for authentication. However, if the
images suffer some modification, the seed is not well recovered and authentication fails. In addition,
the threshold Pth is technology dependent and should be determined empirically. For lower Pth values,
the number of challenge response pairs is higher, but the PUF reliability is worse. In contrast, for higher
Pth values, the PUF reliability is better but the number of challenge response pairs is lower.
The proposal in [25] is similar to [24] but oriented to DVS (Dynamic Vision Sensor) cameras.
In order to isolate the PUF response and to prevent the DVS events from interfering with the PUF
operation, three transistors are added to each pixel. This issue introduces more complexity than the
previous proposal.
In [26], camera identifiers are based on PUFs extracted from ideally exact ring oscillators (ROs).
Two ROs are selected using multiplexers and their frequencies are quantified with two counters.
Both counters stop when another reference counter reaches a predefined value. The values of the two
counters are compared and a response bit is generated depending on the positive or negative value
of the difference. The disadvantage of RO-based PUFs is that additional hardware (the ROs) should
be specifically included in the camera. In [26], ROs are implemented in a trusted visual sensor node
based on a field programmable gate array (FPGA). Another drawback is the extra power consumption
required by the ROs to generate the PUF response.
Most camera identification techniques summarized above are not integrated under a complete
standard cryptographic solution. The camera identifier is generated to authenticate the origin of the
images but there are no specific proposals that describe exhaustively how the camera could satisfy not
only authentication but also confidentiality, integrity, and freshness.
In this work, we present a trusted camera based on SRAM PUFs extracted from the hardware
modules of the camera, without extra hardware required (SRAMs are readily present in many parts of
a camera), with very low extra power consumption, with a lightweight processing cost, and integrated
into a complete cryptographic solution.
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3. A Proposal of Trusted Cameras Based on SRAM PUFs
The proposed trusted cameras are identified by their SRAM PUFS. The extraction of PUFs from
SRAMs is based on the start-up values obtained by powering up the memory. Each SRAM cell is a
bistable circuit whose logic memory functionality comes from two cross-coupled inverters. A write
operation forces the SRAM cell to transition towards one of the two stable states (‘0’ or ‘1’). If the cell is
powered-up and no write operation is carried out, the positive feedback between the two inverters
leads the cell to the start-up value imposed by the inverter which begins to conduct. Ideally, the two
inverters are identical, but the random variations in the manufacturing process make them different so
that one of them is the first to conduct in each cell. Manufacturing process variations are unique of
each SRAM, unpredictable, and difficult to be cloned physically or modeled mathematically. Hence,
the bit strings composed of SRAM start-up values meet the requirements of PUF responses [28,33–35].
SRAM PUFs can be found in the hardware components of a camera so that no extra hardware is
required, which is an advantage compared to the use of the other PUFs commented on in the previous
section. The components of a camera (as illustrated in Figure 1) are the following: (1) the sensing
unit where the image sensor performs the captures and converts the optical image to an electronic
signal; (2) the processing unit (with the main processor), which applies different types of operations
(compression or adjustments of brightness, sharpness or contrast, etc.); and (3) the communication
unit, which includes input and output ports to receive or send data by employing a communication
protocol (particularly Bluetooth and WiFi in the case of cameras on mobile devices). However, typically,
there are SRAMs in the three units. Our proposal is to use the SRAM in the communication unit as
SRAM PUF. Current cameras on mobile devices use wireless communications based on a combination
of WiFi and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). WiFi is activated to establish communications at a high
speed. However, it is much more costly in terms of power consumption. Hence, when the camera is
not transmitting data, the communication module activated is the BLE in order to maintain the camera
connected in a low power consumption mode. When the BLE is activated, the start-up values of its
SRAM are collected as PUF responses.
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Figure 1. Block diagram of a trusted ca era base on S PUFs.
The pro osed trusted cameras have two main operati s: registration or enrollment and
normal operation mode. The registration or enroll ent is required by any camera identification
techniques in order to register the camera by its identifiers or other parameters related to them.
Our proposal is to employ standard cryptographic techniques in the normal operation mode and
identify the camera by its SRAM PUF, so that only a genuine camera with its SRAM PUF and its
non-sensitive information stored in its non-volatile memory is able to reconstruct the cryptographic
key. The non-sensitive information is related to the physical identity of the camera as will be described
in the following.
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3.1. Enrollment Phase
The use of cryptographic techniques with a lightweight processing cost requires the generation
not only of good identifiers but also of nonces. Hence, the proposed trusted cameras are registered
with the following steps. The first step is to select the SRAM cells that provide generally the same
start-up value, which will be named herein as STB cells. For that purpose, the simple processing
described in Algorithm 1 and proposed in [33] is carried out. Most of the SRAM cells are STB cells.
They are considered in the STB_mask. However, the inverters of some cells are very similar so that
their start-up values change due to noise, thus providing flipping bits. These cells change its values in
each start-up and they are not selected for identifiers. Particularly, those which usually change their
start-up values, for example half of the time, are selected to generate the nonces. They are named
herein as RND cells. In Algorithm 1, the number of start-up value changes for each cell is accumulated
in the STB_counter. If the STB_counter is M/2 for a cell, the cell is considered in the RND_mask,
and when it is zero, it is considered in the STB_mask.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code of STB and RND masks extraction
Require: Number of measurements M
for i = 1 to M do
power down and up the SRAM
if i = 1 then
save the start-up values
else
for all the cells of SRAM do
compare the start-up value of the cell with the stored one
if cell value does not change then
do not increase the count for the cell in STB_counter
else
increase the count for the cell in STB_counter
end if
end for
end if
end for
for all the cells of SRAM do
if its count in STB_counter is 0 consider the cell in the STB_mask
if its count in STB_counter is M/2 consider the cell in the RND_mask
end for
reset all STB_counters to zero
return STB_mask, RND_mask
The second step of the enrollment phase is to select the STB cells that provide a debiased PUF
response, which will be named herein as ID cells. This step is needed because a requirement to ensure
the unpredictability property of a PUF is that the number of zeros and ones in the PUF response should
be the same. For that purpose, the simple processing described in Algorithm 2 is carried out. It applies
the pair-output von Neumann (2O-VN) debiasing technique proposed in [36].
Algorithm 2 Pseudo-code of 2O-VN debiasing
Require: STB_mask
power down and up the SRAM
apply the STB_mask and obtain response from N STB cells
for j = 1 to N/2 do
if start-up-value-of-cell(2j) 6= start-up-value-of-cell(2j-1) consider both cells in ID_mask
end for
return ID_mask
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The third step of the enrollment phase is to generate the Helper Data needed to apply a Code
Offset-based Helper Data algorithm as described in [37]. Code Offset-based Helper Data algorithms
employ Error Correcting Codes (ECC) to generate non-sensitive information, known as Helper
Data, from sensitive data such as a cryptographic key and noisy data such as the PUF response.
The complexity of the ECC is higher as the noise (flipping bits) in the PUF response is higher [33]. Since
ID cells do not provide usually flipping bits (they are STB cells), a simple repetition ECC is employed,
as can be seen in Algorithm 3.
The last step of the enrollment phase is to store the non-sensitive information generated
(the ID_mask, RND_mask, and Helper Data) in the non-volatile memory of the camera. The sensitive
information (the start-up values of the SRAM cells and the cryptographic key) are not stored anywhere.
Hence, this solution is more robust to attacks than approaches that directly store the cryptographic key
or the camera identifiers (for example the metadata).
Algorithm 3 Pseudo-code of Helper Data generation
Require: Cryptographic Key K = [k1, . . . , ka], ID_mask
power down and up the SRAM
apply the ID_mask and obtain response from ID cells
each bit of the key is repeated r times: Kcoded = [k11, . . . , k1r, . . . , ka1, . . . , kar]
ID = concatenation of the start-up values of a · r ID cells
Helper Data = ID
⊕
Kcoded
return Helper Data
There are hardware modules that include protection, known as Trusted Platform Modules
(TPMs), which store and process sensitive data in a software protected domain (ARM TrustZone [38],
Texas Instruments M-ShieldTM [39], or Intel®Software Guard Extensions [40]). However, they are
more power hungry and expensive than the standard non-volatile memories used in our proposal.
In addition, several techniques have been reported to attack and extract data from them [41] and
malware has been demonstrated to be run in these hardware enclaves [42].
3.2. Normal Operation Phase
In addition to authentication and freshness (given by the camera identifiers and nonces extracted
from SRAM PUFs), the proposed trusted cameras employ standard cryptographic algorithms to
provide confidentiality and integrity.
Confidentiality is achieved by symmetric ciphering. According to how the data are ciphered,
ciphers can be classified into block and stream ciphers. Block ciphers process blocks of bits while
stream ciphers encrypt bits individually. Among block ciphers, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
was approved in 2001 as a US federal standard (FIPS PUB 197) and then it was included in the
ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard. Hence, AES is the dominant symmetric-key algorithm in many commercial
applications. In particular, many cameras on mobile devices include a hardware module that
implements AES.
Integrity of the messages is achieved by Message Authentication Codes (MACs). MACs are
usually employed to obtain authentication tags (or cryptographic checksums). Block ciphers or hash
functions can be employed to obtain MACs. In practice, the most popular approach is to use a block
cipher such as AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, according to NIST 800-38A [43]. In this
mode, the first iteration of the MAC algorithm is computed with the secret key, an Initialization Vector
(IV) and the first block of the data to encrypt. The subsequent plaintext blocks are XOR-ed with the
previous ciphertext block before they are encrypted. The MAC of the message in CBC-MAC is the
output of the last round. Chaining mode is preferred to encrypt long messages such as images because
each ciphertext block produced not only depends on the plaintext block (and the secret key) but also
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on the preceding blocks. If each block is encrypted independently instead of using chaining mode,
encrypting the same plain text using the same key produces the same cipher text.
The proposed trusted cameras employ AES-CBC as standard authenticated encryption algorithm.
CBC mode requires a 128-bit IV and a key with a default size of 128 bits. The IV should never be
reused under the same key because it leaks some information about the first block of the plain text.
In addition, the IV must be also unpredictable at encryption time. If an attacker knows the IV (or the
previous block of the cipher text) before the next plain text is specified, the attacker can try to obtain
the plain text of some block that was encrypted with the same key before, which is known as the TLS
(Transport Layer Security) CBC IV attack.
The novelty of our proposal is that the start-up values of the SRAM included in the camera are
employed to reconstruct the secret key of 128 bits and to generate the 128 bits for the IV. Whenever
the key is required, the key reconstruction step is carried out as described in Algorithm 4. At key
reconstruction, new start-up values are obtained from the ID cells used in the enrollment phase (known
by the information in the ID_mask). The start-up values will not be exactly the same as the response
used at the Helper Data generation but very similar because a low bit flipping may happen. Hence,
using them and the stored Helper Data, a noisy version of the encoded secret key is obtained. Then,
the decoder of the ECC is able to recover the cryptographic key. In normal operation mode, the required
nonces are obtained from the start-up values of the RND cells, using the information in the RND_mask.
Algorithm 4 Pseudo-code of key reconstruction
Require: Helper Data, ID_mask
power down and up the SRAM
ID = new concatenation of the start-up values of the a · r ID cells
Kcoded = Helper Data
⊕
ID
K = ECC(Kcoded)
return K
4. A Proposal of Trustworthy Communication Protocol with the Trusted Cameras
Let us consider a typical scenario in which a base station communicates with the camera in
the mobile device in order to request the acquisition of images, to update its firmware, etc. Let us
assume an adversarial model in which the attacker has full control of the communication link, that is,
can modify messages, inject message forgeries, replay previously sent messages, or interrupt the
communication. In addition, let us assume that the attacker has the capability to reach the camera
physically and obtain the information stored in it. Not only the base station should prove that the
camera is trusted but also the camera should prove that the base station and its requests are trusted so
as to avoid cyberattacks aimed at malicious uses of the camera.
The trustworthy protocol proposed herein takes advantage of the camera operation modes
to implement a secure communication between the camera and the base station considering the
adversarial capabilities assumed above. It follows the model of secure channels introduced in [44],
in which communications over insecure links are protected through sessions with two stages. First,
the camera and the base station establish an authenticated and shared secret session key. Second,
the session key is used with symmetric-key cryptographic functions to protect the integrity and
confidentiality of the transmitted information.
As in many other protocols, there is an initial phase that is run prior to the initiation of any
communication and that produces the required initial information without any adversarial attacks.
The camera executes a first enrollment phase during the manufacturing process and the first symmetric
key is established between the camera and the base station, assuming no attacks. The first key
established for the camera C is denoted as KC0 . The camera executes Algorithm 3 and stores the Helper
Data, denoted as HDCK0, in the non-volatile memory. Once the first enrollment is finished, the camera
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can be employed in its application context. The base station identifies the camera as the one which
employs the key KC0 .
Figure 2 illustrates the proposed protocol between a camera C and the base station. The notation
used in Figure 2 to describe the operations and the message exchanges is the following:
• [a ‖ b] represents the plaintext “a” concatenated with the plaintext “b”.
• [c]K represents the plaintext “c” encrypted by AES-CBC using the key “K”.
• MACK(d) represents the authentication tag of the message “d” using CBC-MAC with the key “K”.
• “i” represents a randomly initialized index which increases by 1 both in the sender and the
receiver simultaneously after each message exchange is successfully completed.
• nonceB and nonceC represent, respectively, random numbers generated by the base station and
the camera.
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The symmetric keys and the IVs of the AES-CBC are refreshed based on the nonces generat d for
each session. Hence, in order to initiate a commu ication between t e camera and t e base station,
they authenticate each other by their knowledge of KCold and then derive a new session key K
C
new and a
new initialization vector IVCnew. In Figure 2, the key agreement is carried out in Steps 1 and 2. A Key
Derivation Function (KDF) that follows NIST recommendations is employed (in our case, it is based
on AES) [45]. This function uses the previous key KCold, a nonce sent by the base station, nonce
B, and a
nonce sent by the camera, nonceC. In a generic session, a new key and IV are derived from the old ones
as in Equations (1) and (2), respectively:
KCnew = AESKCold
(
nonceB
⊕
nonceC
)
, (1)
IVCnew = AESIVCold
(
nonceB
⊕
nonceC
)
. (2)
The interchanged messages are composed of an index (i) and a request (in the case of the base
station) or a response (in the case of the camera). This is shown in Steps 3 and 4 in Figure 2. For example,
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the message in Step 3 can be the request of updating the firmware together with the firmware to update.
The messages are ciphered with AES-CBC by the symmetric keys (KCold at the key agreement and K
C
new
in the subsequent steps). In addition, the messages are authenticated with CBC-MAC.
AES-CBC is semantically secure or plaintext-indistinguishable, that is, given a target ciphertext
and two candidate plaintexts, the attacker cannot guess the right plaintext with probability significantly
better than 1/2 [44,46]. If the attacker listens all the transmitted information, nothing can be
distinguished, since there are no equal plaintexts (they have different indexes) and the keys and IVs
change in every session in unpredictable way. In addition, CBC-MAC resists chosen message attacks.
Hence, since the proposed protocol applies the encrypt-then-authenticate method, it implements
a secure channel, as demonstrated in [44] and analyzed in [46]. If the attacker has full control of
the communication link, any modification of messages, injection of forgery, or replay of messages
is detected by the recipient. The message index helps to avoid injection or replay attacks and to
detect interruptions.
The camera, when receives a genuine message, is able to decipher it and to verify its integrity.
If the message contains a request of images, the camera acquires the images. If the message contains
a request of firmware update, the camera updates the firmware. Whenever the camera receives a
fake message (the camera cannot decipher it) or an altered one (it does not verify authentication tag),
the camera ignores it.
If the base station does not receive any response to its request after time Tout, it considers that the
reply message is lost or that the camera has not received the message. In that case, the base station
resends the same message until it receives the reply message that contains the index increased or until
surpassing a given number of trials.
In order to reconstruct the new session key, the camera executes Algorithm 3 to generate the new
Helper Data HDCKnew from their SRAM PUF and the new key. Then, it removes HD
C
Kold and stores
HDCKnew in Step 4, once it knows the base station has employed the new key. Similarly, in Step 5,
the base station removes KCold and stores K
C
new for the next communication with camera C, once it knows
the camera has already refreshed the key. The IV is public information that is stored without protection.
If the attacker reaches the camera physically and reads the information stored in the non-volatile
memory, only Helper Data and Masks can be read, but no information about secret keys can be
obtained. The focus herein is the security of the camera. The security of the base station is outside
the scope of this paper. It is assumed that the base station has enough resources to implement a high
security strategy.
Assuming physical access to the camera, the only way to extract information about the secret keys
is to apply side-channel attacks such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks to the AES or MAC
algorithms while they are operating. To avoid them, the hardware implementing those primitives in
the camera should be resistant to those attacks.
5. Experimental Results of the Proof of Concept
5.1. Evaluation of Identifiers Extracted from SRAM PUFs Included in Cameras
As commented above, many cameras on mobile devices use wireless communications based
on a combination of WiFi and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). WiFi instead of BLE is activated when
communication at high speed is required (for transmission of images and videos). When the camera
does not require WiFi, BLE is activated instead to maintain the camera connected in a low power
consumption mode. In order to evaluate if cameras can be identified unequivocally by the SRAM PUFs
available in their BLE chips, the CC2541 BLE chips from Texas Instruments were analyzed. Among the
SRAMs included in the BLE chip, the 8-KB SRAM from the Intel 8051 microcontroller was selected
as PUF. The Intel 8051 microcontroller is also able to access 256-KB of in-system-programmable flash
through a memory arbitrator block. The Helper Data, ID-Mask, and RND_mask are stored in that
non-volatile memory.
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A firmware was developed with the IAR Embedded Workbench to characterize the SRAM PUF
in the BLE chips. The CC-Debugger from Texas Instruments was employed, connected to the BLE
chip through I2C and to a PC through USB. The MSP430TM microcontroller from Texas Instruments
was employed to power down and up the BLE chip so as to extract automatically the start-up values
of the SRAM. The SRAM PUF was evaluated extensively in five BLE chips, taking 56,000 bits per
SRAM (7000 bytes). The environmental conditions that affect mostly the start-up values of SRAMs are
temperature and changes in ramp-up time (i.e., the time to reach power supply voltage value after
power-up) [34], but it is supposed that the ramp-up time cannot be modified because the on-chip
voltage regulator cannot be tampered. In order to evaluate the reliability of the PUF under variations in
temperature, three temperature values (5 ◦C, 25 ◦C and 75 ◦C) were considered and 120 measurements
were taken for each temperature. The climatic chamber ACS EOS 200TC was employed to control the
ambient temperature.
The ID_ and RND_masks for each BLE chip were created with the first 20 measurements at 25 ◦C,
executing Algorithm 1. The resting 100 measurements at all the temperatures were employed for
evaluation. The target of this methodology is to evaluate how a camera, whose enrollment phase is
carried out at nominal conditions (at 25 ◦C), works under different temperature conditions.
The advantages of selecting the STB cells of SRAM cells at enrollment phase are illustrated in
Figure 3. In this figure, 32,768 cells were considered for each SRAM PUF, organized as 16 different
responses with 2048 bits. Figure 3a shows the distribution of Hamming Distances (HD) calculated
for pairs of PUF responses when all the SRAM cells are considered to generate the responses (STB as
well as non-STB cells). HD computes the number of bits that are different in two PUF responses.
The fractional HD, as illustrated in Figure 3, refers to the percentage of bits that are different in two
PUF responses. The distribution of Hamming Distances calculated for responses from the same SRAM
cells (known as genuine distribution in identification applications and intra HD distribution in the
PUF literature) is shown on the left. The distribution of Hamming Distances calculated for responses
from different SRAM cells (known as impostor distribution in identification applications and inter
HD distribution in the PUF literature) is shown on the right. In Figure 3a, the intra HD distribution
corresponds to comparisons of responses from the same SRAM cells at the three temperatures by
considering all the possible combinations. The inter HD distribution is the fusion of all the possible
comparisons between cells from different SRAMs.
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After applying the debiasing with Algorithm 2, the ID cells are found. 2O-VN Debiasing is very 
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Figure 3b shows the distribution of Hamming Dista l lated for pairs of PUF respon es
when only the STB cells are considered to generate the responses (filtered with the STB_mask calculated
at 25 ◦C). The minimum percentage of STB cells found was 73.59% (which means a minimum of 41,213
STB cells for the cells evaluated in each SRAM). In Figure 3b, like in Figure 3a, 32,768 STB cells were
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considered for each SRAM PUF, organized as 16 different responses with 2048 bits. The intra HD
distribution, at the left, contains two peaks. The distribution with the peak closer to 0 corresponds
to the comparisons of responses at 25 ◦C. The other part of the intra HD distribution is related to
comparisons of responses at different temperatures. Compared with Figure 3a, bit flipping is reduced
in the genuine responses, as desired in reliable PUFs. Regarding the inter HD distribution, it is more
compact than without applying classification. In any case, it can be seen that the inter HD distribution
is not centered at 0.5, which means that the PUF responses do not contain the same number of ones
and zeros.
After applying the debiasing with Algorithm 2, the ID cells are found. 2O-VN Debiasing is very
simple computationally, but it eliminates many cells. The minimum percentage of ID cells found among
STB cells was 35.55% (which means a minimum of 14,651 ID cells for the cells evaluated in each SRAM).
Figure 4 shows the distribution of Hamming Distances calculated for pairs of PUF responses when only
the ID cells are considered to generate the responses. In this figure, 11,648 ID cells were considered for
each SRAM PUF, organized as 16 different responses with 728 bits. The intra HD is shown on the left
and the inter HD distribution is illustrated on the right. The intra HD distribution is similar to the
result in Figure 3b since ID cells are STB cells. Thus, bit flipping is reduced and it is possible to extract
reliable identifiers from the same camera. Regarding the inter HD distribution, there is a considerable
improvement when using ID instead of STB cells because the distribution is centered at 0.5. Thus,
identifiers from different cameras are very different. As a matter of fact, the Hamming Weight (defined
as the percentage of ones in the PUF responses) has an averaged value of 49.55%, which means that
distribution of ones and zeros is uniform, as required in unpredictable PUFs.
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5.2. Obfuscation of Secret Keys by SRAM PUFs Included in Ca eras
As described in Algorithm 3, Help r Data are g n rated from XOR-ing the PUF response with the
secret encoded with a repetition ECC. Hence, elper Data do not leak informati n about the secret if
the PUF response is highly random. A necessary f ature o r ndom PUF responses is to be uniform,
which is achieved by considering ID cells, as shown above.
Another way to evaluate the randomness of k P F responses with a·r bits is to calculate the
minimum entropy as:
Hmin =
1
a·r ·∑
a·r
i=1 log2(pimax), (3)
where pimax is the maximum probability of the i-th bit taking logic value ‘0’ or ‘1’ in the k responses [33].
If Hmin is 1, the k PUF responses are 100% independent and there are no correlations between the bits
in different responses. This is the ideal situation to generate Helper Data that are quite independent
and do not reveal information about the secret.
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The minimum entropy of the impostor responses shown in Figure 4, corresponding to nominal
operating conditions (25 ◦C), calculated as in Equation (3), is 91.92%. This means that the secrets are
almost fully obfuscated because the responses are highly random.
Considering PUF responses with ID cells generated at nominal operating conditions, we have
studied the Helper Data generated by employing either the same secret key for all the cameras or a
different secret key for each camera. In both cases, the Helper Data associated with each camera are
different. Figure 5 illustrates the inter HD distributions of both Helper Data. An interesting result is
that they are very similar (they are centered at 0.5 within a similar range). Therefore, if an attacker
could extract the Helper Data of the cameras, he/she could not know if they are associated or not to
the same secret key.Sensors 2018, 18, x FOR PEER REVIEW  15 of 21 
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As described in Algorithm 4, the decoder of the ECC should cope with the noise of PUF responses
to reconstruct the secret key without failures from the Helper Data. The bit flipping of a start-up
value can be modeled essentially as a Bernoulli trial, which takes value ‘1’ (if the bit changes) with
probability p and a value of ‘0’ (if the bit does not change) with probability 1 − p. If the n bits obtained
from the start-up values of n cells are assumed to be independent, the probability of finding t flipping
bits (or errors) in them is given by a binomial distribution. Hence, the probability that a PUF response
of n bits contains more than t flipping bits is given by:
Ptotal = 1−
t
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
·pi·(1− p)n−i. (4)
The probability Ptotal provides the failure probability in reconstructing a bit of the secret key
when using an ECC with n-bit codewords and capacity to correct up to t errors, with p estimated by
the average fractional HD of the genuine population [33,37]. For a given Ptotal , the number of errors
(flipping bits) to be corrected and, hence, the complexity of the ECC, decreases as the value of the
average fractional HD for the genuine population gets lower. This is why using only ID cells instead
of all SRAM cells is advantageous.
The average fractional value of intra HD distribution obtained with ID cells (shown in Figure 4
above) is 0.0261. If this value is employed for p in Equati n (4), an 8-bit repetition Error Correcting
Code (with n = 8 and t = 3) gives a pr bability of failure in reconstructing a bit of th secret
key K of 2.99 × 10-5 (according to the operation 1-binocdf (3, 8, 0.0261) i MATLAB 2017b from
MathW rks®). Therefore, the probability to find some error in a 128-bit secret key is 0.0038 (1-binocdf
(0, 128, 2.99 × 10−5)). F r a 16-bit repetition Error Correcting Code, Equation (4) is evaluated by
considering n = 16 and t = 7 since the probability of failure in reconstructing a bit of the secret key
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K would be equivalent to the probability that 8 bits of Kcoded differ from Kcoded in eight bits or more.
The resulting value for the probability is 2.30 × 10−9 (according to the operation 1-binocdf (7, 16,
0.0261)). Therefore, the probability to find some error in a 128-bit secret key is 2.94 × 10−7 (1-binocdf
(0, 128, 2.30 × 10−9)). Hence, a 16-bit repetition Error Correcting Code is selected since an error rate of
10−6 is considered by many authors as a conservative value that fulfills the requirements of most of
the typical security applications [37,47].
In order to evaluate experimentally, the key reconstruction step with a 16-bit repetition ECC,
the 100 measurements from the five BLE chips and the three temperatures were employed to reconstruct
the secret key from the Helper Data associated with each device and calculated with the same secret
key. The Hamming Distances calculated between the correct secret key and the reconstructed secret
key when a genuine camera is employed (the secret key is reconstructed with the Helper Data and the
PUF response of a genuine camera) are all zero, as shown on the left side of Figure 6. On the other side,
the Hamming Distances calculated between the correct secret key and the reconstructed secret key
when an impostor camera is employed (the secret key is reconstructed with the Helper Data of another
camera and the PUF response of the impostor camera) are not zero but are centered at 0.5, as shown on
the right side of Figure 6.
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Table 1 shows a comparison wi other proposals in the literatur also aimed at securing cameras
with hardware-based PUFs [24–26]. Our proposal is preferred whenever the hardware of the camera
cannot be designed specifically to integ te the PUF into the image s nsor [24,25] or into the controller
of the virtual sensor node [26]. Our proposal can be applied to any camera on a mobile device by
registering it and updating its firmware with the proposed trustworthy protocol described in Section 4
in order to execute the algorithms described in Section 3.
Table 1. Comparison with other proposals using hardware-based PUFs.
Proposal Worst-case AverageIntra HD (%) Average Inter HD (%) Results Specific Hardware
Frame-based image
sensor [24]
12 (Pth = 0)
0.2 (Pth = 80)
49.37 Experimental, with variations ofnomi al conditions Required
Event-based image
sensor [25] 3.70 49.96
Simulated, with variations of
nominal conditions Required
Trusted visual
sensor node [26] 1.40 ~49.0
Experim ntal, with no variations
of nominal conditions Required
This work 2.61 49.67 Experimental, with variations ofnomi al conditions Not required
In all of the proposals shown in Table 1, the PUF uniqueness, evaluated by the average inter HD,
shows a value close to the ideal value of 0.5. The PUF reliability, evaluated by the worst-case average
intra HD, changes more. In [24], a high reliability can be obtained by increasing the threshold Pth.
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For that purpose, Pth should be empirically determined and adjusted based on the characterization of
the sensor fabrication process. In [25], reliability was calculated with simulation results considering
variations of the operation conditions. In [26], reliability was measured with only nominal operation
conditions. Reliability of our proposal (measured experimentally under variations of nominal operation
conditions) can be further improved if the extraction of STB_mask considers measurements at all
the range of temperatures, as described in [33]. Anyway, since the achieved reliability is good and
can be managed by a simple repetition ECC, only measurements at nominal temperatures have been
considered in Algorithm 1 in order to carry out the enrollment phase faster. The computational cost of
applying a repetition ECC is much lower than applying BCH codes, as employed by other authors [25].
5.3. Evaluation of Nonces Extracted from SRAM PUFs Included in Cameras
The RND_masks for each BLE chip were created with the first 20 measurements at 25 ◦C, executing
Algorithm 1. The RND cells were the cells taking ‘0’ ten times and ‘1’ the other ten. The minimum
number of RND cells found in the BLE chips was 265 (0.47% of the 56,000 bits evaluated). This quantity
is enough to generate the 128-bit nonces.
The sequences generated by the same RND cells at different start-ups (considering 10 BLE chips)
were compared in pairs to calculate the average fractional Hamming distances. The result was 0.48,
which is almost the ideal value of 0.5 for random sequences. The minimum entropy calculated as in
Equation (3) with 100 measurements (from 1 to 100 start-ups) from the RND cells of one of the devices
at nominal temperature converges to 75%, as shown in Figure 7.
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The 100 sequences generated by the RND cells of one BLE chip after 100 power-up measurements
at nominal temperature was evaluated by the NIST test suite for randomness [48]. The result of
applying the frequency, forward and backward cumulative sums, and runs NIST tests to these
sequences are shown in Table 2. The frequency test measures if the number of ones and zeros in
the sequences are approximately the same as would be expected for a truly random sequence. This test
is passed if the Hamming weight of the nonces tended to be 0.5, that is, the number of ones and zeros
tended to be the same and there is no bias. The cumulative sums of the bits in the subsequences that
can be formed from the complete sequence (considering ‘1’ and ‘−1′ values) should be zer , as in the
complete sequence. In the forward mode, the s bsequences are formed rom the beginning to the
end of the complete sequence, and, in backwar mode, the subsequences are formed from the end to
the b ginning. The cumulative test measures if the sub equences o an unpredictabl sequence are
also unpredictable. The runs test measures if the oscillation among substrings f consecutive ones
and consecutive zeros is too fast or too slow.Columns 1–10 in Table 2 correspond to the frequency of
p-values (the unit interval is divided into ten discrete bins). Column 11 is the p-value that arises via
the application of a chi-square test. Each NIST test is statistical and the p-values of a set of sequences
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are obtained. The proportion of sequences that pass a statistical test should fall inside the confidence
interval (in this case, it is of 99%). Column 12 is the proportion of binary sequences that passed.
The minimum pass rate for each statistical test is approximately 96 for a sample size of 100 binary
sequences. Therefore, the bit strings provided by the RND cells of the BLE chips passed the basic NIST
tests for randomness.
Table 2. Basic NIST tests evaluated for the sequences provided by RND cells.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 P-value Proportion Statistical Test
12 9 11 7 6 20 8 10 6 11 0.085587 96/100 Frequency
9 10 6 9 8 12 3 17 15 11 0.090936 96/100 CumulativeSums(fw)
10 7 8 6 7 22 4 9 12 15 0.003201 96/100 CumulativeSums(bw)
15 8 11 12 10 9 9 14 10 6 0.494392 98/100 Runs
These measurements prove that BLE chip was able to generate nonces with 128 bits to be employed
in the initialization vector and the key derivation functions.
5.4. Proof of Concept of a Trusted Camera
A low-cost camera based on Raspberry Pi 2 model B was developed as a proof of concept.
It employs an 8-megapixel sensor (Raspberry Pi Camera Module v2), which can provide video as well
as still photographs. As BLE communication, it employs the CC2541 module connected to the GPIOs
(General Purpose Input/Outputs) of the Raspberry. Figure 8a shows a photograph of the prototype.
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Picamera library for Python was used to work with the sensor module. The RPi.GPIO library
allows working easily with the GPIO to power down and up the BLE chip and to extract the start-up
values of the SRAM. A firmware implements the algorithms described in Section 3 to carry out the
enrollment and normal operation phases. The PyCrypto library was used to manage the block cipher
AES using a 128-bit secret key to encrypt and decrypt data as well as the CBC mode using a 128-bit
initialization value.
As an example, an image taken by the camera and its corresponding ciphered result are illustrated
in Figure 8b,c, respectively. The Tkinter library was employed to develop a Graphical User Interface to
visualize the results.
6. Conclusions
The security of the control actions and firmware updates of a camera is increased by the proposal
of a trusted camera and a communication protocol based on SRAM PUFs. The solution has been
carefully designed to satisfy the constraints of low-cost cameras included in mobile devices by selecting
lightweight and standard cryptographic al orithms and by avoiding ad itional hardware. We have
analyzed SRAM PUFs extracted from com ercial BLE chips which an be typically i l in
the communication module of a c mera. Camera identifi cted from these BLE chips allow
obfuscating sensitive 128-bit secret keys int itive elper Data. Only the genuine trusted
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camera can recover the secret key from the Helper Data when it is required (thus, authentication is
satisfied). In addition, 128-bit nonces are extracted from the SRAMs of the BLE chips. The secret keys
and the IVs generated are employed for the standard authenticated encryption algorithm AES-CBC.
Nonces are employed to derive session information by means of a Key Derivation Function based on
AES. Confidentiality and integrity are satisfied by means of the authenticated encryption. Freshness is
satisfied by means of the derivation of session information. The evaluation of the SRAM PUFs extracted
from the BLE chips proves the properties of uniqueness, reliability, randomness and unpredictability.
In spite of considering measurements from the BLE chips under temperature variations and a simple
repetition Error Correcting Code, the secret keys are recovered perfectly. As a proof of concept,
a Raspberry Pi-based mobile camera was developed, which contains the BLE chip as a communication
unit that could be powered down and up to extract the SRAM PUF. In this work, we have detailed
a security solution based on SRAM PUFs oriented to low-cost cameras. However, since SRAMs are
included in many devices, the proposed solution can be applied to other low-cost devices. This will be
considered as future lines of this work.
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